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HAK Briefing

on SALT


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June 20, 1972

Documentation on the Strategic Arms Limitations Agreements

On June 7, 1972, we sent you the June 5 issue of the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, which contained documentation on the recently concluded SALT agreements. Enclosed is additional recent documentation on this subject:

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- (1) Testimony by Secretary of State Rogers on June 19 before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee;*
- (2) Text of President Nixon's message of June 13 transmitting to the Senate the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms;
- (3) Letter of June 10 from Secretary Rogers to President Nixon transmitting the antiballistic missile treaty, the interim agreement and associated protocol, and the agreed interpretations and unilateral statements;
- (4) Remarks of the President at a congressional briefing on June 15;
- (5) Remarks of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, at a congressional briefing on June 15.

*Secretary Rogers was accompanied by Ambassador Gerard Smith, Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to SALT and Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

STATEMENT BY THE
HONORABLE WILLIAM P. ROGERS
TO THE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
IN SUPPORT OF THE SALT AGREEMENTS
JUNE 19, 1972

I

Mr. Chairman:

I am pleased to appear before you in support of the Treaty on the limitation of ABM systems and the Interim Agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms.

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/29 : LOC-HAK-225-2-2-7 report and its enclosures, the President urged your support so that the two agreements can be brought into force as soon as practicable. These agreements are important not just for our people; they are important for all people. They are important not only for the achievements they represent, but also for the opportunities they present. Strategic arms limitation is not a one-time effort but a continuing process.

These agreements are a significant achievement.

They constitute an unprecedented step in controlling strategic arms. They are tangible evidence that both sides are moving into an era of negotiation. The two sides now have an important investment in cooperation which they are not likely to risk lightly. The U.S. and the Soviet Union have thus indicated a recognition that their relations can be improved by cooperation in some areas even though there remain important differences in others.

This success in SALT recognizes that global security is interdependent, and that unconstrained weapons competition is contrary to the interests of the nuclear powers, and of the world.

II

During the SALT negotiations over the last two and a half years we have kept in mind the need for wide support, both nationally and internationally, for any agreements reached. To that end the Administration has closely consulted the Congress. We have also regularly consulted with our Allies.

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I believe there is wide support for these agreements. The Administration welcomes this opportunity to consider them with you. We are pleased to know that the Congress plans full consideration of these two documents, both with officials of the Executive Branch and with the public. This is a process that is fundamental to our American system. It will broaden the base of understanding and support for what has been achieved, and will assist in the search for additional strategic arms limitations.

III

Let me place the SALT agreements in perspective.

When this Administration entered office early in 1969, we faced a strategic situation in which the USSR was engaged in a broad and dynamic buildup of its strategic offensive missile launchers. It was clear that a rough balance in strategic forces between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was approaching. However, there was not then -- and there is not now -- any question that the U.S. could and would maintain strategic forces adNo Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/29 : LOC-HAK-225-2-2-7 none. As President Nixon stated in his Foreign Policy Report of February, 1971, "both sides would almost surely commit the necessary resources to maintain a balance." The President further noted that any Soviet attempt to obtain a large advantage "would spark an arms race which would, in the end, prove pointless."

Through negotiation -- rather than competition -- we had an opportunity to achieve a more stable strategic relationship with the USSR and to seek -- over time -- to create a situation in which both sides could use more of their resources for purposes other than building more strategic weapons.

IV

After thorough preparations by the new Administration, SALT began in November, 1969, in Helsinki. Initially, the talks concentrated on exploration of strategic principles and development of an agenda for future work. The next phases focused on comprehensive proposals. However, problems over definition of strategic systems and over the basis for limitation of such systems made clear that it would be extremely difficult to negotiate a single comprehensive agreement. The Soviets then pressed for an initial agreement limiting only anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems. We believed that such an agreement would not make as great a contribution to stability as limitations on both offensive and defensive strategic systems.

This impasse was resolved by the breakthrough announced by the President on May 20, 1971. The two Governments agreed to work out

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arrangements limiting deployment of ABMs, and at the same time to agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms.

After the May 20 understanding, the principal issues were how broad a coverage of offensive forces could be agreed, and how to frame in concrete terms agreement in principle to limit ABMs to a low level. These general questions contained numerous and complex specific issues, which took another year of hard negotiating to work out. The two agreements before you are the successful result of that work.

V

Mr. Chairman, a detailed analysis of the two agreements was made in my letter of submittal to the President. I believe it would be helpful this morning to consider what these agreements would do. I will touch on certain of their most important provisions. Following my statement, Ambassador Smith is prepared to join me in answering questions you may have.

Let me say as a preface to this discussion that in both agreements the U.S. has sought, where necessary, to set forth detailed obligations in the text. No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/29 : LOC-HAK-225-2-2-7 referred to put clarifying material or elaboration in Agreed Interpretations, and where this was sufficient, that approach was used. These Agreed Interpretations have been transmitted to the Congress; they include initialled statements and other common understandings. In certain cases where agreement could not be reached, U.S. views were stated formally in unilateral statements. Those, too, have been transmitted to the Congress. There are no secret agreements.

VI

I would like to address first the ABM Treaty. Under this Treaty, both sides make a commitment not to build a nation-wide ABM defense. This is a general undertaking of utmost significance. Without a nation-wide ABM defense, there can be no shield against retaliation. Both great nuclear powers have recognized, and in effect agreed to maintain, mutual deterrence.

Therefore, I am convinced beyond doubt that the possibility of nuclear war has been dramatically reduced by this Treaty.

A major objective of SALT has been to reduce the tensions, uncertainties and high costs which flow from the upward spiral of strategic arms competition. While the cost savings from these first SALT agreements will be limited initially, over the long term we will save the tens of billions of dollars which might otherwise have been required for a nation-wide ABM defense.

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Furthermore with an interim limitation on offensive weapons -- which we hope will lead to a more comprehensive and permanent limitation -- there will be a break in the pattern of action and reaction under which each side reacts to what the other is doing, or may do, in an open-ended situation. This cycle until now has been a major factor in driving the strategic arms race.

The heart of the Treaty is Article III, which spells out the provisions under which each of the parties may deploy two limited ABM complexes, one in an ICBM deployment area, and one at its national capital. There can be no more than 100 ABM launchers, and 100 associated interceptors, at each complex -- a total of 200.

The two ABM deployment complexes permitted each side will serve different purposes. The limited ABM coverage in the ICBM deployment area will afford some protection for ICBMs in the area. ABM coverage at the national capitals will permit protection for the National Command Authority against a light attack, or an accidental or unauthorized launch of a limited number of missiles, and this decreases the chances that on, it will buy some time against a major attack, and its radars would help to provide valuable warning.

ABM radars are strictly limited. There are also important limitations on the deployment of certain types of non-ABM radars. The complex subject of radar control was a central question in the negotiations because radars are the long lead-time item in development of an ABM system.

The treaty provides for other important qualitative limitations. The parties will undertake not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based. They have also agreed not to develop, test or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to modify launchers to provide them with such a capability; nor to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers; nor to develop, test, or deploy ABM missiles with more than one independently guided warhead.

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Perhaps of even greater importance as a qualitative limitation is that the parties have agreed that future exotic types of ABM systems, i.e. systems depending on such devices as lasers, may not be deployed, even in permitted areas.

One of the more important corollary provisions deals with prohibiting the upgrading of anti-aircraft systems, what has been called the "SAM-upgrade" problem. The conversion or testing of other systems, such as air-defense systems or components thereof, to perform an ABM role is prohibited as part of a general undertaking not to provide an ABM capability to non-ABM systems.

The undertakings in the ABM Treaty, and in the Interim Agreement, have been devised so as to assure that they can be verified by national technical means of verification. For the types of arms control measures in these agreements, modern national technical means of verification are the most practical and a fully effective assurance of compliance. No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/29 : LOC-HAK-225-2-2-7 does not to interfere with each side's national technical means of verification and not to use deliberate concealment measures to impede the effectiveness of these means.

The Treaty contains another significant "first" in Soviet-American arms control. A Standing Consultative Commission will, on a regular basis, consider the operations of the Treaty as well as questions of compliance. The Commission will also have the function of considering proposals for further increasing the viability of the Treaty. It will assure that even after the completion of the follow-on negotiations there will be a continuing strategic dialogue between the two powers.

The duration of the ABM Treaty is unlimited. But it contains a withdrawal clause of the kind which has characterized post-war arms control agreements. Each party can withdraw if it decides that extraordinary events relating to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Notice of such a decision, including a statement of the extraordinary events involved, must be given six months prior to withdrawal.

VII.

The interrelationship between limitations on offensive and defensive strategic arms which the US has repeatedly stressed is reflected in the expressed intention to continue active negotiations for limitations on

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strategic arms. As was pointed out in my submittal letter, the special importance attached by the United States to this relationship was set forth in a formal statement by Ambassador Smith recording the position of the United States Government that if an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, US supreme interests could be jeopardized, and should that occur it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the Treaty. I believe that this withdrawal right, which is exercisable on our judgment alone, fully protects our security interests in the event that the follow-on negotiations were not to succeed and that the strategic situation became such that we felt obliged to exercise it.

VIII.

Mr. Chairman, I would like now to turn to the Interim Agreement and its Protocol.

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/29 : LOC-HAK-225-2-2-7
number of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers operational and under construction on each side for up to five years. We hope that it will be replaced well before that time by a more complete agreement in treaty form covering strategic offensive weapons.

Under the Agreement, in Articles I and II, the parties undertake a commitment not to construct additional fixed ICBM launchers and not to convert launchers for light or older ICBMs into launchers for modern heavy ICBMs. This undertaking by the Soviet Union should be viewed in terms of the concern in this country during the past several years about the continued buildup in numbers of Soviet ICBMs, particularly the heavy SS-9 ICBMs. The growth in numbers of both light and heavy Soviet ICBM launchers has now been stopped.

The Agreement does not specify the number of ICBMs operational and under construction when it was signed. We have made it abundantly clear to the Soviets, however, that we consider this number for the USSR to be 1618. Specifying the number of ICBMs in the Agreement is not important, since national means of verification will reveal if any new ICBM construction, which is prohibited by the Agreement, were to take place.

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Article III and the Protocol limit SLBM launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines. The agreement contains undertakings not to build such launchers and submarines above a given number.

A ceiling of 62 has been set for the USSR on the number of operational modern submarines (Y-class nuclear-powered submarines). A ceiling of 950 SLBM launchers has been set for the USSR. This ceiling is to include all launchers on nuclear-powered submarines (Y-class and H-class submarines) and modern launchers on older submarines (G-class diesel-powered submarines).

In effect, the Agreement freezes SLBM launchers at present levels except that additional SLBM launchers can be built if they replace older strategic launchers on a one-for-one basis.

The Soviets are permitted to have no more than 740 launchers on nuclear-powered submarines of any type, operational and under construction, unless they effect replacement in accordance with agreed procedures. T
No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/29 : LOC-HAK-225-2-2-7 ambiguous baseline which avoids uncertainty or debate over the definition of "under construction."

To reach 950 SLBMs on modern submarines, the USSR must retire older ballistic missile launchers -- specifically, those for SS-7 and SS-8 ICBMs and on H-class submarines. The first SLBM launcher after the 740th launcher must be a replacement. The older ICBM or SLBM launchers being replaced will be dismantled beginning no later than the date on which the submarine containing the 741st launcher begins sea trials.

I might add that this one-way mix concept -- permitting replacement of land-based launchers with submarine-based launchers -- was first suggested by the US early in SALT as a way of achieving greater strategic stability.

The USSR could retain the existing older launchers on G-class submarines, in addition to 950 launchers on modern submarines. However, any launchers for modern SLBMs on these older diesel-powered submarines would have to be included in the 950 ceiling.

The modernization and replacement provisions of the Interim Agreement will permit both sides to improve their missile forces, but the restrictions on converting launchers for light ICBMs or older

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heavy ICBMs to launchers for modern heavy ICBMs will place important qualitative restrictions on Soviet programs. The conversion of current US ICBM launchers to handle Minuteman III missiles and the conversion of current Polaris submarines to handle Poseidon missiles, as well as the construction of new submarines as replacement for older ones, will not be prohibited.

The Agreement provides for application of the same verification procedures and commitments about non-concealment and non-interference as contained in the ABM Treaty. The Standing Consultative Commission will also be used to promote the objectives and the implementation of the Interim Agreement.

There is a commitment to continue active negotiations for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The Agreement also stipulates that its terms will not prejudice the scope and terms of the follow-on negotiations.

The offensive arms limitations are temporary and not comprehensive. They do not cover all strategic delivery vehicles. For example, strategic bombers, where the US already has a very large advantage, are not limited by the Interim Agreement.

The Interim Agreement does not limit on-going US offensive arms programs. It does stop the Soviet Union from increasing the number of its strategic offensive missile launchers. These limitations on Soviet strategic offensive forces, in conjunction with very low limits on ABMs on both sides, clearly advance US security interests.

Looked at overall, our forces are clearly sufficient to protect our, and our Allies', security interests. US strategic forces are qualitatively superior and more effective than Soviet strategic forces. The USSR has more missile launchers. The US has more missile warheads. We have many more strategic bombers. Moreover, numbers alone are not an illuminating or useful measure for judging the strategic balance.

IX.

With these two agreements, we should have a more secure and stable strategic relationship with the USSR.

Both sides gain assurance that their strategic missile deterrent forces will not be rendered ineffective by the other's ABM system.

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But even with the advantages that these two agreements will bring, we must keep our strategic forces up-to-date if these are to continue their central role for deterrence. Our forces must be adequate to deter attack on -- or coercion of -- the US and its Allies. The relationship between US and Soviet strategic forces must be such that our ability and resolve to protect our vital interests and those of our Allies will not be underestimated by anyone. I am sure the Congress agrees.

X.

Mr. Chairman, I have presented an overview of the basic undertakings of these agreements and of their significance.

I think it wrong to ask who "won" or "lost" the initial SALT negotiations. In matters involving the central security interests of two great powers, any arms limitation agreement must respond to each side's needs. The agreements must gain the support of both sides.

With these two agreements we enter a new era in arms control, and what may have been difficult or impossible in the past may now be attainable. It should now be possible for both sides to agree to additional limitations, including reductions.

The security of the United States will be strengthened by these two agreements.

They will make possible a more rational and stable strategic relationship.

They should help to improve American-Soviet relations and preserve and strengthen international security and world order.

The threat of nuclear war will be dramatically reduced.

These Agreements will give the world greater hope for the future.

Mr. Chairman, I urge that this Committee and the Senate support the ABM Treaty and its accompanying Interim Agreement.

* * * * *

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The President's Message to the Senate Transmitting the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms. June 13, 1972*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972. Copies of these agreements are also being forwarded to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. I ask the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty, and an expression of support from both Houses of the Congress for the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms.

These agreements, the product of a major effort of this administration, are a significant step into a new era of mutually agreed restraint and arms limitation between the two principal nuclear powers.

The provisions of the agreements are explained in detail in the No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/29 : LOC-HAK-225-2-2-7.

Their main effect is this: The ABM Treaty limits the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems to two designated areas, and at a low level. The Interim Agreement limits the overall level of strategic offensive missile forces. Together the two agreements provide for a more stable strategic balance in the next several years than would be possible if strategic arms competition continued unchecked. This benefits not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but all the nations of the world.

The agreements are an important first step in checking the arms race, but only a first step; they do not close off all avenues of strategic competition. Just as the maintenance of a strong strategic posture was an essential element in the success of these negotiations, it is now equally essential that we carry forward a sound strategic modernization program to maintain our security and to ensure that more permanent and comprehensive arms limitation agreements can be reached.

The defense capabilities of the United States are second to none in the world today. I am determined that they shall remain so. The terms of the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement will permit the United States to take the steps we deem necessary to maintain a strategic posture which protects our vital interests and guarantees our continued security.

Besides enhancing our national security, these agreements open the opportunity for a new and more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship, characterized by negotiated

settlement of differences, rather than by the hostility and confrontation of decades past.

These accords offer tangible evidence that mankind need not live forever in the dark shadow of nuclear war. They provide renewed hope that men and nations working together can succeed in building a lasting peace.

Because these agreements effectively serve one of this Nation's most cherished purposes—a more secure and peaceful world in which America's security is fully protected—I strongly recommend that the Senate support them, and that its deliberations be conducted without delay.

RICHARD NIXON

The White House
June 13, 1972

Letter to the President From the Secretary of State Transmitting the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms, With Agreed Comments.

June 13, 1972

June 10, 1972

The President:

I have the honor to submit to you the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) and the Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Interim Agreement), including an associated Protocol. It is my recommendation that the ABM Treaty be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

The Interim Agreement, as its title indicates, is an agreement limited in scope and time. It is designed to limit the aggregate number of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, and the number of modern ballistic missile submarines, pending the negotiation of a treaty covering more complete limitations of strategic offensive arms. In these circumstances, I am submitting to you the Interim Agreement and its Protocol (which is an integral part of the Agreement), with the recom-

* A similar letter transmitting these documents was sent to the Speaker of the House on the same day.

mendation that they be transmitted to both Houses of Congress for approval by a Joint Resolution.

The Interim Agreement can by its terms enter into force only upon the exchange of written notices of acceptance by both countries and only when and if the ABM Treaty is brought into force. Both signatories understand that, pending ratification and acceptance, neither will take any action that would be prohibited by the ABM Treaty or the Interim Agreement and Protocol, in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or acceptance.

ABM TREATY

In broad outline, the ABM Treaty, signed on May 26, 1972, provides that:

- A nationwide ABM deployment, and a base for such deployment, are prohibited;
- An ABM deployment for defense of an individual region is prohibited, except as specifically permitted;
- No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/29 : LOC-HAK-225-2-2-7 noteworthy unilateral statements.
- widely separated deployment areas in each country—one for defense of the national capital, and the other for the defense of ICBMs;
- For these purposes no more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites may be deployed within each 150-kilometer radius ABM deployment area, for a total of 200 deployed ABM interceptors and 200 deployed ABM launchers for each Party;
- ABM radars will be strictly controlled; radars to support the ABM defense of the national capital may be deployed only in a specified number of small radar complexes within the ABM deployment area; radars to support the ICBM defense will be limited to a specified number within the ABM deployment area and will also be subject to qualitative constraint.

In order to assure the effectiveness of these basic provisions of the Treaty, a number of detailed corollary provisions were also agreed:

- Development, testing and deployment of ABM systems or ABM components that are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based are prohibited;
- Deployment of ABM systems involving new types of basic components to perform the current functions of ABM launchers, interceptors or radars is prohibited;

- The conversion or testing of other systems, such as air defense systems, or components thereof to perform an ABM role is prohibited.

The Treaty also contains certain general provisions relating to the verification and implementation of the Treaty and to further negotiations:

- Each side will use national technical means for verification and the Parties agree not to interfere with such means and not to take deliberate concealment measures;
- A Standing Consultative Commission will be established to facilitate implementation of the Treaty and consider questions arising thereunder;
- The Parties will continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

The ABM Treaty consists of a preamble and sixteen Articles. As indicated in Article I(1), it provides for limitations on anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems as well as certain related measures. In the course of the negotiations, agreement was reached on a number of interpretive matters related to the Treaty. Enclosure 3 contains agreed

PREAMBLE

The preamble contains six paragraphs that set forth common premises and objectives of the United States and the Soviet Union which are the basis for entering into this Treaty.

The first preambular paragraph states the basic premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind.

The second and third preambular paragraphs indicate the rationale for the ABM Treaty and the accompanying Interim Agreement. Effective limits on anti-ballistic missile systems will be an important factor in curbing competition in the strategic offensive arms race, will decrease the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war, and will, together with certain agreed measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, create a favorable climate for future negotiations on limiting strategic arms.

The fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs indicate the relationship of this Treaty to the undertaking of the Parties in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament", and express the intention of the Parties to achieve further progress in disarmament at the earliest possible date.

The sixth paragraph reflects the broad international consensus that effective measures to limit strategic arms will assist in relaxing international tensions and strengthening trust between nations. As the first bilateral agreements between nuclear powers limiting strategic nuclear arms, this Treaty and the Interim Agreement should serve as historic steps toward these broader political goals.

A. LIMITATIONS ON ABM SYSTEMS

(1) *Deployment*

Article I(2) prohibits the deployment of ABM systems which would provide defense covering substantially the whole of the territory of a Party. ABM defenses of individual regions are also prohibited except as specifically set forth in Article III. As more fully explained below, that Article limits not only the number, size and location of the permitted ABM deployment areas of each Party, but also limits to low levels the numbers of ABM launchers and ABM interceptors at launch sites, and places restrictions on ABM radars, and thus has the effect of precluding thick regional ABM defenses.

Article I(2) also includes an undertaking not to provide a No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/29 : LOC-HAK-225-2-2-7 for example, prohibit the construction and deployment of ABM radars, or even ABM-capable radars deployed for other purposes, that could provide a base for a nationwide ABM system. (Articles III, IV, V and VI contain specific constraints that reinforce this prohibition.) The Treaty does not restrict air defense, space tracking, intelligence or other non-ABM systems *per se*. However, it does prohibit the testing or conversion of such systems or their components to perform an ABM role; moreover, the Parties have agreed not to deploy any phased-array radars over a certain size except as otherwise provided in the Treaty and except for the purpose of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification. This would prevent the possible use of such radars as a base for a nationwide ABM defense.

Article II defines an ABM system as "a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory". It indicates that such systems currently consist of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars. ABM interceptor missiles are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type hereafter tested in an ABM mode. ABM launchers are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles. (A launcher associated with an interceptor missile that is hereafter tested in an ABM

mode falls within the definition of an ABM launcher.) ABM radars are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role (including target tracking or missile control, but not early warning), or of a type hereafter tested in an ABM mode.

The second paragraph of Article II makes it clear that the ABM system components listed in the first paragraph of the Article include not only those which are operational, but also those under construction, undergoing testing, undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion, or mothballed.

Article III prohibits the deployment of any ABM systems or their components except as provided therein. Under Article III, the Parties may deploy only systems consisting of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars. The limited deployment of such systems described in the next two paragraphs below is permitted only (a) within one deployment area centered on the nation's capital and having a radius of 150 kilometers, and (b) within one other deployment area having the same radius and containing ICBM silo launchers. The centers of the two deployment areas will be separated by

... a Party may deploy no more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites. These totals would include any deployments within such areas for training purposes and, as indicated in Article II(2), would not be confined to those in operational status. In view of Article V(1), discussed below, only fixed, land-based ABM components may be deployed.

The restrictions on ABM radars cover radars of both existing types: phased-array radars (a modern type which scans by electronic means, a capability especially useful for ABM purposes) and mechanical-scan radars (an older type). These restrictions are as follows:

(i) Within the 150-kilometer radius deployment area centered on the nation's capital, no qualitative or quantitative constraints on radars are imposed, but location is circumscribed as follows: a Party may have ABM radars within no more than 6 ABM radar complexes, the permitted area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than 3 kilometers. Phased-array ABM radars may not be located outside such complexes, regardless of when they become operational. Mechanical-scan ABM radars that become operational after May 26, 1972 are similarly constrained. The Parties understand that in addition to the ABM radars which may be de-

ployed in accordance with this provision, the Soviet mechanical-scan ABM radars operational on May 26, 1972 within the deployment area for defense of its national capital may be retained.

(ii) Within the 150-kilometer radius deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, the location of radars is not circumscribed, but qualitative and quantitative constraints are imposed. A Party may have:

- 2 large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in such a deployment area; and
- no more than 18 ABM radars each having a potential less than that of the smaller of the 2 large phased-array ABM radars referred to above.

The only two large phased-array ABM radars operational or under construction in such a deployment area on the date of signature were the Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) and Missile Site Radar (MSR) under construction near Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota. The Parties understand that the potential—the ^{pro} in s₁—MSR) is considered for purposes of the Treaty to be three million.

The impact of Article III on ABM systems currently deployed or under construction would be as follows: it would not prohibit the ABM system deployed around Moscow or the ABM system being deployed by the United States in the vicinity of Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota, but it would preclude the completion or retention of the ABM complex on which construction had been started in the vicinity of Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana. (The signatories understand that, pending ratification and acceptance of the agreements, neither will take any action that would be prohibited thereby in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval.)

The United States has not started construction at a deployment area centered on its national capital, and the Soviet Union has not started construction at a deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers.

(2) *Development, Testing, and Other Limitations*

Article IV provides that the limitations in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or ABM components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. It is understood

that ABM test ranges encompass the area within which ABM components are located for test purposes, and that non-phased-array radars of types used for range safety or instrumentation purposes may be located outside of ABM test ranges. Article IV further provides that each Party may have no more than a total of 15 ABM launchers at test ranges. The current United States test ranges for ABM systems are located at White Sands, New Mexico and Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific. The current Soviet test range for ABM systems is located near Sary Shagan, Kazakhstan SSR. ABM components are not to be deployed at any other test ranges without prior agreement between the Parties.

Article V limits development and testing, as well as deployment, of certain types of ABM systems and components. Paragraph V(1) limits such activities to fixed, land-based ABM systems and components by prohibiting the development, testing or deployment of ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. It is understood that the prohibitions on mobile ABM systems apply to ABM ^{pro} in s₁—which are not permanent ^{pro} in s₁—types.

Paragraph V(2) prohibits the development, testing or deployment of ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher; modification of deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability; and the development, testing or deployment of automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers. The Parties agree that this Article includes an obligation not to develop, test, or deploy ABM interceptor missiles with more than one independently guided warhead.

(3) *Future ABM Systems*

A potential problem dealt with by the Treaty is that which would be created if an ABM system were developed in the future which did not consist of interceptor missiles, launchers and radars. The Treaty would not permit the deployment of such a system or of components thereof capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, or radars: Article II(1) defines an ABM system in terms of its function as “a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory,” noting that such systems “currently” consist of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars. Article III contains a prohibition on the deployment of ABM systems or their components except as specified therein, and it permits deployment only of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars. Devices other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM

launchers, or ABM radars could be used as adjuncts to an ABM system, provided that such devices were not capable of substituting for one or more of these components. Finally, in the course of the negotiations, the Parties specified that "In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty." (As explained below, Article XIII calls for establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission, and Article XIV deals with amendments to the Treaty.)

(4) *Modernization and Replacement*

Article VII provides that, subject to the provisions of this No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/29 : LOC-HAK-225-2-2-7, systems or their components may be carried out. Modernization or replacement of present ABM systems or components is constrained by the various limitations and prohibitions in the Treaty. (See paragraph 2 of Article I, Article III, Article V, and Article VI.)

(5) *Destruction and Dismantling*

Article VIII provides that ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in the Treaty, as well as ABM systems or components prohibited by the Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time. Since no more than one ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers is permitted by Article III, this Article will apply, when the Treaty enters into force, to the ABM components previously under construction in the vicinity of Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana.

B. OTHER RELATED MEASURES

(1) *Constraints on Non-ABM Systems or Components*

Article VI is designed to enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the basic limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by the Treaty. To this end, each Party undertakes in this Article (a) not to give missiles, launchers or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars, capabilities to

counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory; (b) not to test such non-ABM missiles, launchers and radars "in an ABM mode" and (c) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

The first of these undertakings would, for example, prohibit the modification of air-defense missiles (SAMs) to give them a capability against strategic ballistic missiles.

The undertaking not to test non-ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars in an ABM mode subsequent to the date of signature of this Treaty would prohibit testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes, but would not affect ABM testing of ABM components, or prevent testing of non-ABM components for non-ABM purposes.

With respect to the third of the undertakings in Article VI, it should be noted that the Treaty, while not intended to prohibit the further deployment of radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack, requires their Party's national territory and oriented outward in order to minimize the possibility that they could contribute to an effective ABM defense of points in the interior.

Article VI also has the effect of prohibiting the future deployment in third countries of radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack. Existing ballistic missile early-warning radars would not be affected. Article VI imposes no limitation on radars for national means of verification.

In recognition of the fact that phased-array radars with more than a certain potential, though deployed for non-ABM missions such as air defense or air traffic control, would have an inherent capacity for ABM use, the Parties agreed not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential exceeding three million watt-square meters, except as provided in Articles III, IV and VI of the Treaty and except for the purpose of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification. Deployment of non-ABM radars currently planned by the United States would not be affected.

(2) *International Transfers*

Article IX provides that, to assure the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by the Treaty. The Parties understand that the first undertaking includes an obligation not to provide to other states

technical descriptions or blueprints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty. In addition, the United States Delegation made clear that the provisions of this Article do not set a precedent for whatever provisions may be considered for a treaty on limiting strategic offensive arms, noting that the question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution.

(3) *Conflicting Obligations*

Article X contains an undertaking by the Parties not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with the Treaty. The obligations in this Treaty are not inconsistent with any obligation of the United States under any international agreement.

C. VERIFICATION AND CONSULTATION

(1) *Verification*

Article XII relates to verification of compliance with the Treaty's provisions, which is to be accomplished by national technical means. Paragraph 1 states that each Party shall dispose of its ABM systems and components in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law for purposes of providing assurance of compliance with provisions of the Treaty. It does not require changes from current operating practices and procedures with respect to systems which will be used as national technical means of verification.

The second paragraph of this Article provides that each Party agrees not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other which are operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of the Article. This provision would, for example, prohibit interference with a satellite in orbit used for verification of the Treaty.

Paragraph 3 contains an agreement not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means. This paragraph expressly permits continuation of current construction, assembly, conversion and overhaul practices.

(2) *Standing Consultative Commission*

Article XIII provides that the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission (hereafter referred to as the Commission) to promote the objectives and to facilitate the implementation of the ABM Treaty. The Parties have further agreed to use the Commission to promote the objectives and implementation of the Interim Agreement. (See Article VI of the Interim Agreement.) The Commission will provide a consulting frame-

work within which the Parties may consider various matters relating to the Treaty and the Interim Agreement. The Parties may also consider these matters in other channels.

A principal function of the Commission will be to consider questions of compliance with the obligations assumed under this Treaty and the Interim Agreement and also related situations which may be considered ambiguous. Each Party may voluntarily provide through the Commission information it considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance. Thus one Party might raise a question of compliance based on information gathered by national technical means of verification and the other Party could provide information to clarify the matter.

Attention was called above to the provisions in Article XII prohibiting intentional interference with national technical means of verification operating in accordance with its provisions. The Commission is charged by Article XIII with the responsibility to consider any questions of interference with such means. The Commission may also consider questions of concealment impeding verification by national means. The Commission may consider changes which have a bearing on the provisions of the Treaty. Related to this is the Commission's authority to consider proposals to further increase the viability of the Treaty—such as agreed interpretations after the Treaty has entered into force—and to consider proposals for amendment of the Treaty. (Amendments to the Treaty would have to be ratified pursuant to Articles XIV and XVI.) The Commission may also consider other appropriate measures, not specifically enumerated in Article XIII, aimed at further limiting strategic arms. Finally, through the Commission the Parties are to agree on procedures and dates for the implementation of Article VIII concerning destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or ABM components. (For corresponding responsibility of the Commission under the Interim Agreement, see section C of the discussion thereof.)

The second paragraph of Article XIII provides for the establishment of regulations for the Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters. Such matters can be worked out early in the follow-on negotiations. Meanwhile, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the Delegations during such negotiations or, when they are not in session, through other diplomatic channels.

The Commission is intended as a means to facilitate the implementation of the agreements and would not replace follow-on negotiations or use of other diplomatic channels.

D. DURATION, WITHDRAWAL AND FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS

Article XV provides that the Treaty shall be of unlimited duration, but contains a withdrawal clause of the type that has become standard in post-war arms control treaties. This clause provides that each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, shall have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Notice of such decision is to be given to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice is required to include a statement of the extraordinary events involved.

In this connection, the United States has stressed the unique relationship between limitations on offensive and defensive strategic arms. This interrelationship lends extraordinary importance to the undertaking in Article XI "to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms."

The special importance we attach to this relationship was reflected in the following formal statement relating to Article XI, which was made by the Head of the United States Delegation on May 9, 1972.

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US Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The US Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The USSR Delegation has also indicated that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, US supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The US does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the US Government attaches to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The US Executive will inform the Congress, in connection

with Congressional consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, of this statement of the US position.

E. OTHER PROVISIONS

Article XIV deals with amendments and review. Paragraph 1 provides that the Parties may propose amendments to the Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification. The second paragraph of Article XIV provides for formal review of the Treaty by the Parties at five year intervals. Paragraph 2 does not preclude agreement on proposed amendments of the Treaty during the first five years, or between formal reviews thereafter; it simply reflects recognition of the possibility of changes in the strategic relationship and the development of new strategic systems. These questions are also within the purview of the Standing Consultative Commission.

Article XVI and the final paragraph of the Treaty contain standard provisions on entry into force, registration pursuant to the United Nations Charter, and equal authentication of the Treaty in Russian and English language texts.

INTERIM AGREEMENT AND PROTOCOL

The Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Interim Agreement), including a Protocol which is integral thereto, was signed on May 26, 1972. The Interim Agreement consists of a preamble and eight operative articles. In the course of the negotiations, agreement was reached on a number of interpretive matters related to the Interim Agreement. Enclosure 3 contains agreed interpretations and certain noteworthy unilateral statements.

This Agreement provides for a restriction of five years on strategic offensive missile launcher deployments pending negotiation of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The main effects of the Interim Agreement will be that:

- the aggregate number of fixed, land-based ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers will be limited;
- starting construction of additional fixed, land-based ICBM launchers is prohibited;
- the number of launchers for modern heavy ICBMs, such as the Soviet SS-9, will be limited to that number currently operational and under construction;

- ceilings will be placed on the number of SLBM launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines operational on each side; and
- up to the agreed ceilings, deployment of additional SLBM launchers above a specified number for each Party requires an offsetting reduction of ICBM launchers of older types or SLBM launchers on older ballistic missile submarines.

In the first paragraph of the preamble of the Agreement the Parties express the conviction that the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement will contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiation on limiting strategic arms and will improve international relations. In the second paragraph the Parties acknowledge the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms, and in the third they acknowledge their obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to pursue disarmament negotiations.

A. ICBM LAUNCHERS

Article I of the Interim Agreement prohibits starting construction of additional fixed land-based ICBM launchers. No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/29 : LOC-HAK-225-2-2-7, the freeze date, the United States and the Soviet Union understand that, pending ratification and acceptance of the agreements, neither will take any action that will be prohibited thereby, in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval.

This construction freeze covers all fixed land-based ICBM launchers, both silo and soft-pad, but does not include test and training ICBM launchers or mobile land-based ICBM launchers. Test and training launchers are, however, subject to other constraints. The United States has made clear to the Soviets that we would consider the deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the Interim Agreement to be inconsistent with the objectives of the Agreement. The Parties have agreed that the term ICBM includes any land-based strategic ballistic missile capable of ranges in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental United States and the northwestern border of the continental Soviet Union. Launchers for fractional orbital bombardment systems are considered to be ICBM launchers.

On May 26, 1972, the United States had 1,054 operational, land-based ICBM launchers and none under construction; on that date, the Soviet Union had a total of land-based ICBM launchers operational and under active

construction estimated to be about 1,618. (ICBM launchers for testing and training purposes are excluded in each case.) Under the freeze, the Soviet Union may complete construction of ICBM launchers under active construction on May 26, 1972. While the Interim Agreement remains in effect, neither Party may start new construction (nor resume previously suspended construction) of fixed ICBM launchers except test and training launchers.

B. HEAVY ICBM LAUNCHERS

Article II provides that the Parties shall not convert land-based launchers for light, or older heavy, ICBMs into land-based launchers for modern heavy ICBMs, such as the Soviet SS-9. All currently operational ICBMs other than the SS-9 are either "light" (the United States Minuteman and the Soviet SS-11 and SS-13) or "older" ICBM launchers of types first deployed prior to 1964 (the United States Titan and the Soviet SS-7 and SS-8).

Article II would thus prohibit the conversion of a launcher for an SS-7, SS-8, SS-11 or SS-13 ICBM into a launcher for an SS-9 or any new modern heavy ICBM, and would similarly prohibit the conversion of a launcher for a modern heavy ICBM. The Parties agree that in the process of modernization and replacement the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly increased, and that this means that any increase will not be greater than 10-15 percent of the present dimensions. The United States has also made clear that it would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side (which is the Soviet SS-11) to be a heavy ICBM.

C. SLBM LAUNCHERS AND MODERN BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES

Article III limits SLBM launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on May 26, 1972.

In addition, Article III and the Protocol permit launchers and submarines beyond 740 SLBM launchers on nuclear-powered submarines for the Soviet Union and 656 SLBM launchers on nuclear-powered submarines for the United States, subject to two constraints. First, additional SLBM launchers may become operational only as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of types first deployed prior to 1964, or for launchers on

older nuclear-powered submarines or for modern SLBM launchers on any type of submarine. Second, such substitution may not result in:

- the Soviet Union having operational more than 62 modern ballistic missile submarines or more than 950 SLBM launchers, including all SLBM launchers on nuclear-powered submarines and all modern SLBM launchers on any type of submarine;
- the United States having operational more than 44 modern ballistic missile submarines or more than 710 SLBM launchers.

Construction of replacement SLBM launchers up to the limits under the Protocol would require the dismantling or destruction, under agreed procedures, of an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types or of SLBM launchers on nuclear-powered submarines. Moreover, modern SLBM launchers deployed on any type of submarine would count against the total ceiling on SLBM launchers. Dismantling or destruction would be required to commence no later than the date on which sea trials of a replacement ballistic missile submarine begin and to be completed no later than the date on which the first

Thus, ICBM or SLBM launchers no later than when the 741st SLBM launcher on a nuclear-powered submarine enters sea trials. Dismantling or destruction, as well as timely notification thereof, are to be carried out in accordance with procedures to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission.

D. TEST AND TRAINING LAUNCHERS

The Parties agree that the number of test and training launchers for ICBMs and SLBMs, including "modern heavy" ICBMs, shall not be increased significantly above the current number of test and training launchers for such missiles. It is understood that construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for the purposes of testing and training. It is also understood that ICBM launchers for test and training purposes may be constructed at operational sites.

E. MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT

Article IV provides that, subject to the provisions of the Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic ballistic missiles and launchers covered by the Interim Agreement may be undertaken. The conversion of current United States ICBM launchers to handle Minuteman III missiles, the conversion of current submarine

launchers to handle Poseidon missiles, and the construction of new submarines as replacements for older submarines, are not prohibited by the Agreement.

F. OTHER PROVISIONS

Article V of the Interim Agreement contains the same provisions on verification as appear in Article XII of the ABM Treaty. Verification will be carried out by national technical means operating in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law. Interference with, or deliberate concealment from, such means is prohibited. Neither Party is required to change its current practices of construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul.

Article VI provides that in order to promote the objectives and implementation of the Interim Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission to be established pursuant to Article XIII of the ABM Treaty.

In Article VII the Parties agree to continue active negotiation for limitations on strategic offensive arms. This of this Interim Agreement will not prejudice the scope and terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the subsequent negotiations. It is expected that these subsequent negotiations will start in the near future.

The first paragraph of Article VIII of the Interim Agreement provides that it shall enter into force upon the exchange of written notices of acceptance, simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the ABM Treaty.

Paragraph 2 of Article VIII provides that the Interim Agreement shall remain in effect for five years, unless earlier replaced by agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms.

The third paragraph of this Article provides each Party with a right, parallel to that contained in paragraph 2 of Article XV of the ABM Treaty, to withdraw upon six months' notice if such Party decides its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Interim Agreement.

CONCLUSION

I believe the Treaty limiting anti-ballistic missile systems, together with the accompanying Interim Agreement and its Protocol constraining strategic offensive arms, constitute the most important step in arms limitation ever taken by this country. In these agreements, the two most

powerful nations on earth are adopting measures designed to curb the deployment of strategic arms.

The Parties have protected their vital interests during the careful negotiation and elaboration of these agreements. We did not agree to anything adversely affecting the national interests of our Allies, who were regularly consulted during the negotiations. The Congress has been kept closely informed throughout the negotiations. Ambassador Smith and other Delegation members conducted a total of thirty executive session briefings for Congressional Committees.

These Agreements should help to improve Soviet-American relations and preserve and strengthen international security and world order. The entry into force of these measures should significantly advance the cause of peace in the world, and I hope that they can be brought into force as soon as practicable.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM P. ROGERS

Enclosures:

1. The ABM Treaty.

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/29 : LOC-HAK-225-2-2-7's, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;

3. Agreed Interpretations and Unilateral Statements.

(Enclosure 1)

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,

Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic

arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament,

Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.

2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.

Article II

1. For the purposes of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:

(a) interceptors, which are interceptors constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;

(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and

(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are:

(a) operational;

(b) under construction;

(c) undergoing testing;

(d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or

(e) mothballed.

Article III

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:

(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and

(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phased-array ABM radars.

Article IV

The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.

Article V

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, nor to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

Article VI

To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by this Treaty, each Party undertakes:

(a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode; and

(b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

Article VII

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out.

Article VIII

ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.

Article IX

To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.

Article X

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.

Article XI

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

Article XII

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

✓ (g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

Article XIV

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

Article XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XVI

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

RICHARD NIXON

President of the United States of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

LEONID I. BREZHNEV

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

(Enclosure 2)

INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms will contribute to the creation of negotiations on limiting strategic arms as well as to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States,

Taking into account the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake not to start construction of additional fixed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972.

Article II

The Parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time.

Article III

The Parties undertake to limit submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on the date of signature of this Interim Agreement, and in addition to launchers and submarines constructed under procedures established by the Parties

as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or for launchers on older submarines.

Article IV

Subject to the provisions of this Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive ballistic missiles and launchers covered by this Interim Agreement may be undertaken.

Article V

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement.
 No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/29 : LOC-HAK-225-2-2-7U
 overhaul practices.

Article VI

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Interim Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established under Article XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems in accordance with the provisions of that Article.

Article VII

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. The obligations provided for in this Interim Agreement shall not prejudice the scope or terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the course of further negotiations.

Article VIII

1. This Interim Agreement shall enter into force upon exchange of written notices of acceptance by each Party, which exchange shall take place simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

2. This Interim Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years unless replaced earlier by an agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms. It is the objective of the Parties to conduct

active follow-on negotiations with the aim of concluding such an agreement as soon as possible.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Interim Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Interim Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Interim Agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Done at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

RICHARD NIXON

President of the United States of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

LEONID I. BREZHNEV

General Secretary of the Central Com-

PROTOCOL

TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Having agreed on certain limitations relating to submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines, and to replacement procedures, in the Interim Agreement,

Have agreed as follows:

The Parties understand that, under Article III of the Interim Agreement, for the period during which that Agreement remains in force:

The US may have no more than 710 ballistic missile launchers on submarines (SLBMs) and no more than 44 modern ballistic missile submarines. The Soviet Union may have no more than 950 ballistic missile launchers on submarines and no more than 62 modern ballistic missile submarines.

Additional ballistic missile launchers on submarines up to the above-mentioned levels, in the U.S.—over 656 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, and in the U.S.S.R.—over 740 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, operational and under construction, may become operational as replacements for equal numbers of ballistic missile launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or of ballistic missile launchers on older submarines.

The deployment of modern SLBMs on any submarine, regardless of type, will be counted against the total level of SLBMs permitted for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

This Protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Interim Agreement.

Done at Moscow this 26th day of May, 1972.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

RICHARD NIXON

President of the United States of America

For No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/29 : LOC-HAK-225-2-2-7

LEONID I. BREZHNEV

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

(Enclosure 3)

1. AGREED INTERPRETATIONS.

(a) *Initialed Statements.*

The texts of the statements set out below were agreed upon and initialed by the Heads of the Delegations on May 26, 1972.

ABM Treaty

[A]

The Parties understand that, in addition to the ABM radars which may be deployed in accordance with subparagraph (a) of Article III of the Treaty, those non-phased-array ABM radars operational on the date of signature of the Treaty within the ABM system deployment area for defense of the national capital may be retained.

[B]

The Parties understand that the potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) of the smaller of the two large phased-

array ABM radars referred to in subparagraph (b) of Article III of the Treaty is considered for purposes of the Treaty to be three million.

[C]

The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers.

[D]

The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) exceeding three million, except as provided for in Articles III, IV and VI of the Treaty, or except for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification.

[E]

In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.

[F]

The Parties understand that Article V of the Treaty includes obligations not to develop, test or deploy ABM interceptor missiles for the delivery by each ABM interceptor missile of more than one independently guided warhead.

[G]

The Parties understand that Article IX of the Treaty includes the obligation of the US and the USSR not to provide to other States technical descriptions or blueprints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty.

Interim Agreement

[H]

The Parties understand that land-based ICBM launchers referred to in the Interim Agreement are understood to be launchers for strategic ballistic missiles capable of ranges in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental U.S. and the northwestern border of the continental USSR.

[I]

The Parties understand that fixed land-based ICBM launchers under active construction as of the date of signature of the Interim Agreement may be completed.

[J]

The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly increased.

[K]

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tion of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 and ballistic missile launchers on older submarines being replaced by new SLBM launchers on modern submarines will be initiated at the time of the beginning of sea trials of a replacement submarine, and will be completed in the shortest possible agreed period of time. Such dismantling or destruction, and timely notification thereof, will be accomplished under procedures to be agreed in the Standing Consultative Commission.

[L]

The Parties understand that during the period of the Interim Agreement there shall be no significant increase in the number of ICBM or SLBM test and training launchers, or in the number of such launchers for modern land-based heavy ICBMs. The Parties further understand that construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for purposes of testing and training.

(b) Common Understandings.

Common understanding of the Parties on the following matters was reached during the negotiations:

A. Increase in ICBM Silo Dimensions

Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 26, 1972: "The Parties agree that the term 'significantly increased' means that an increase will not be greater than 10-15 percent of the present dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers."

Minister Semenov replied that this statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.

B. Location of ICBM Defenses

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972: "Article III of the ABM Treaty provides for each side one ABM system deployment area centered on its national capital and one ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers. The two sides have registered agreement on the following statement: 'The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers.' In this context, the ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, located west of the Mississippi River, will be centered in the Grand Forks ICBM silo launcher deployment area." (See Initialed Statement [C].)

C. ABM Test Ranges

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on April 26, 1972: "Article IV of the ABM Treaty provides that 'the limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges.' We believe it would be useful to assure that there is no misunderstanding as to current ABM test ranges. It is our understanding that ABM test ranges encompass the area within which ABM components are located for test purposes. The current U.S. ABM test ranges are at White Sands, New Mexico, and at Kwajalein Atoll, and the current Soviet ABM test range is near Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan. We consider that non-phased array radars of types used for range safety or instrumentation purposes may be located outside of ABM test ranges. We interpret the reference in Article IV to 'additionally agreed test ranges' to mean that ABM components will not be located at any other test ranges with-

out prior agreement between our Governments that there will be such additional ABM test ranges."

On May 5, 1972, the Soviet Delegation stated that there was a common understanding on what ABM test ranges were, that the use of the types of non-ABM radars for range safety or instrumentation was not limited under the Treaty, that the reference in Article IV to "additionally agreed" test ranges was sufficiently clear, and that national means permitted identifying current test ranges.

D. Mobile ABM Systems

On January 28, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: "Article V(1) of the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty includes an undertaking not to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based ABM systems and their components. On May 5, 1971, the U.S. side indicated that, in its view, a prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems and components would rule out the deployment of ABM launchers and radars which were not permanent fixed types. At that time, we asked for the Soviet view of this interpretation. Does the Soviet side agree with the U.S. side's interpretation put forward on May 5, 1971?"

On April 13, 1972, the Soviet Delegation said there is a general common understanding on this matter.

E. Standing Consultative Commission

Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 24, 1972: "The United States proposes that the sides agree that, with regard to initial implementation of the ABM Treaty's Article XIII on the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and of the consultation Articles to the Interim Agreement on offensive arms and the Accidents Agreement,* agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out early in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is in session, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session, *ad hoc* arrangements for any desired consultations under these Articles may be made through diplomatic channels."

Minister Semenov replied that, on an *ad referendum* basis, he could agree that the U.S. statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.

*See Article 7 of Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed September 30, 1971.

F. Standstill

On May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following statement: "In an effort to accommodate the wishes of the U.S. side, the Soviet Delegation is prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides will in fact observe the obligations of both the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning from the date of signature of these two documents."

In reply, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972: "The U.S. agrees in principle with the Soviet statement made on May 6 concerning observance of obligations beginning from date of signature but we would like to make clear our understanding that this means that, pending ratification and acceptance, neither side would take any action prohibited by the agreements after they had entered into force. This understanding would continue to apply in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval."

The Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with the U.S. statement.

(a) The following noteworthy unilateral statements were made during the negotiations by the United States Delegation:—

A. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty

On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the following statement: "The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The USSR Delegation has also indicated that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would con-

stitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The U.S. does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the USSR does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Executive will inform the Congress, in connection with Congressional consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement of this statement of the U.S. position."

B. *Land-Mobile ICBM Launchers*

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972: "In connection with the important subject of land-mobile ICBM launchers, in the interest of concluding the Interim Agreement the U.S. Delegation now withdraws its proposal that Article I or an agreed statement explicitly prohibit the deployment of mobile land-based ICBM launchers. I have been instructed to inform you that, while agreeing to defer the question of limitation of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers to the sub-
on stra-
deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the Interim Agreement as inconsistent with the objectives of that Agreement."

C. *Covered Facilities*

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972: "I wish to emphasize the importance that the United States attaches to the provisions of Article V, including in particular their application to fitting out or berthing submarines."

D. *"Heavy" ICBMs*

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972: "The U.S. Delegation regrets that the Soviet Delegation has not been willing to agree on a common definition of a heavy missile. Under these circumstances, the U.S. Delegation believes it necessary to state the following: The United States would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM. The U.S. proceeds on the premise that the Soviet side will give due account to this consideration."

E. *Tested in ABM Mode*

On April 7, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: "Article II of the Joint Draft Text uses the term 'tested in an ABM mode,' in defining ABM com-

ponents, and Article VI includes certain obligations concerning such testing. We believe that the sides should have a common understanding of this phrase. First, we would note that the testing provisions of the ABM Treaty are intended to apply to testing which occurs after the date of signature of the Treaty, and not to any testing which may have occurred in the past. Next, we would amplify the remarks we have made on this subject during the previous Helsinki phase by setting forth the objectives which govern the U.S. view on the subject, namely, while prohibiting testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes: not to prevent testing of ABM components, and not to prevent testing of non-ABM components for non-ABM purposes. To clarify our interpretation of 'tested in an ABM mode,' we note that we would consider a launcher, missile or radar to be 'tested in an ABM mode' if, for example, any of the following events occur: (1) a launcher is used to launch an ABM interceptor missile, (2) an interceptor missile is flight tested against a target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic missile flight trajectory, or is flight tested in an ABM mode, (3) an ABM radar at the same test range, or is flight tested to an altitude inconsistent with interception of targets against which air defenses are deployed, (3) a radar makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle of the kind referred to in item (2) above during the reentry portion of its trajectory or makes measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range. Radars used for purposes such as range safety or instrumentation would be exempt from application of these criteria."

F. *No-Transfer Article of ABM Treaty*

On April 18, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: "In regard to this Article [IX], I have a brief and I believe self-explanatory statement to make. The U.S. side wishes to make clear that the provisions of this Article do not set a precedent for whatever provision may be considered for a Treaty on Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms. The question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution."

G. *No Increase in Defense of Early Warning Radars*

On July 28, 1970, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: "Since Hen House radars [Soviet ballistic missile early warning radars] can detect and track ballistic missile warheads at great distances, they have a significant ABM potential. Accordingly, the U.S. would

regard any increase in the defenses of such radars by surface-to-air missiles as inconsistent with an agreement."

(b) The following noteworthy unilateral statement was made by the Delegation of the U.S.S.R. and is shown here with the U.S. reply:—

On May 17, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following unilateral "Statement of the Soviet Side:" "Taking into account that modern ballistic missile submarines are presently in the possession of not only the U.S., but also of its NATO allies, the Soviet Union agrees that for the period of effectiveness of the Interim 'Freeze' Agreement the U.S. and its NATO allies have up to 50 such submarines with a total of up to 800 ballistic missile launchers thereon (including 41 U.S. submarines with 656 ballistic missile launchers). However, if during the period of effectiveness of the Agreement U.S. allies in NATO should increase the number of their modern submarines to exceed the numbers of submarines they would have operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Agreement, the Soviet Union will have the right to No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/29 : LOC-HAK-225-2-2-7 extended, because Dr. Kissinger today will be presenting the Presidential views. He will be telling you what the President's participation has been in these negotiations. The views he will express I have gone over with him in great detail, and I will stand by them.

In the opinion of the Soviet side, the solution of the question of modern ballistic missile submarines provided for in the Interim Agreement only partially compensates for the strategic imbalance in the deployment of the nuclear-powered missile submarines of the USSR and the U.S. Therefore, the Soviet side believes that this whole question, and above all the question of liquidating the American missile submarine bases outside the U.S., will be appropriately resolved in the course of follow-on negotiations."

On May 24, Ambassador Smith made the following reply to Minister Semenov: "The United States side has studied the 'statement made by the Soviet side' of May 17 concerning compensation for submarine basing and SLBM submarines belonging to third countries. The United States does not accept the validity of the considerations in that statement."

On May 26 Minister Semenov repeated the unilateral statement made on May 17. Ambassador Smith also repeated the U.S. rejection on May 26.

The President's Remarks at a Briefing for Five Congressional Committees. June 15, 1972

Ladies and gentlemen, we are beginning a little late because I understand traffic is quite heavy around the White House this morning due to the arrival of the President of Mexico. We, however, must go forward with the schedule,

because there is a joint session, as you know, today and we do want the members of the committees present here to be able to attend that session. We will have to adjourn this meeting at approximately 12 o'clock, or at best, 5 minutes after 12, and we want to give you plenty of time for questions.

A word about the format of this meeting. I will make a statement, and then I will have to depart in order to prepare for the arrival of the President of Mexico. Dr. Kissinger will then make a statement, and then will be open to questions to the members of the committees that are present here.

In order to get some recognition factor developed by someone who knows all of the Members who are here, Clark MacGregor, will moderate the question-and-answer period, but we will try to be just as fair as possible among the members of the committees and between the House and the Senate, and Clark, of course, will be responsible in the event that it isn't fair.

In any event, let me come directly now to my own extended, because Dr. Kissinger today will be presenting the Presidential views. He will be telling you what the President's participation has been in these negotiations. The views he will express I have gone over with him in great detail, and I will stand by them.

I noted in the press that it was suggested that I was calling down the members of these committees for the purpose of giving you a pep talk on these two agreements. Let me lay that to rest right at the outset. This is not a pep talk and Dr. Kissinger is not going to make you a pep talk either.

When I came back from the Soviet Union, you will recall in the joint session I said that we wanted a very searching inquiry of these agreements. I want to leave no doubt about my own attitude.

I have studied this situation of arms control over the past 3½ years. I am totally convinced that both of these agreements are in the interest of the security of the United States and in the interest of arms control and world peace. I am convinced of that, based on my study. However, I want the Members of the House and the Members of the Senate also to be convinced of that. I want the Nation to be convinced of that.

I think that the hearings that you will conduct must be searching because only in that way will you be able to be convincing to yourselves and only in that way will the Nation also be convinced.

In other words, this is not one of those cases where the President of the United States is asking the Congress and

the Nation to take on blind faith a decision that he has made and in which he deeply believes.

I believe in the decision, but your questions should be directed to Dr. Kissinger and others in the Administration for the purpose of finding any weaknesses that you think in the negotiations or in the final agreements that we have made.

As far as the procedures are concerned, as you know, you will be hearing the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the head of the CIA, and of course, Ambassador Smith, in your sessions of the various committees.

I know that a number have suggested that Dr. Kissinger should appear before the committees as a witness. I have had to decline that particular invitation on his part, due to the fact that Executive privilege, I felt, had to prevail.

On the other hand, since this is really an unprecedented situation, it seemed to me that it was important that he appear before the members of the committees in this format. This is on the record.

All of you will be given total transcripts of what he says. All questions and in the event that all of the questions are not asked on this occasion, he, of course, will be available to answer other questions in his office from members of the committees as time goes on, during the course of the hearings.

What we are asking for here, in other words, is cooperation with and not just rubber-stamping by the House and the Senate. That is essential because there must be follow-through on this and the Members of the House and Senate, it seems to me, must be convinced that they played a role, as they have up to this point, and will continue to play a role in this very, very important field of arms control.

Now, let me go to the agreements, themselves, and express briefly some of my own views that I think are probably quite familiar to you, but which I think need to be underlined.

I have noted a great deal of speculation about who won and who lost in these negotiations. I have said that neither side won and neither side lost. As a matter of fact, if we were to really look at it very, very fairly, both sides won, and the whole world won.

Let me tell you why I think that is important. Where negotiations between great powers are involved, if one side wins, and the other loses clearly, then you have a built-in tendency or incentive for the side that loses to break the agreement and to do everything that it can to regain the advantage.

This is an agreement which was very toughly negotiated on both sides. There are advantages in it for both sides. For that reason, each side has a vested interest, we believe, in keeping the agreement rather than breaking it.

I would like for you to examine Dr. Kissinger, and our other witnesses, before the committees on that point. I think you also will be convinced that this was one of those cases where it is to the mutual advantage of each side, each looking to its national security.

Another point that I would like to make is Presidential intervention in this particular matter—Presidential coordination—due to the fact that what we have here is not one of those cases where one department could take a lead role. This cut across the functions of the Department of State, the Department of Defense, it cut across, also, the AEC, and, of course, the Arms Control Agency.

Under these circumstances, there is only one place where it could be brought together, and that was in the White House, in the National Security Council, in which all of these various groups participated.

There is another reason, which has to do with the system of government in the Soviet Union. We have found in the Soviet Union, that where decisions are made that affect the vital security, in fact, the very survival of a nation, decisions and discussions in those cases are made only at the highest level. Consequently, it is necessary for us to have discussions and decisions at the highest level if we are going to have the breakthroughs that we have had to make in order to come to this point of a successful negotiation.

The other point that I would make has to do with what follows on. The agreement that we have here, as you know, is in two stages: one, the treaty with regard to ABM defensive weapons; and second, the offensive limitation, the Executive agreement, which is indicated as being, as you know, not a permanent agreement—it is for 5 years—and not total. It covers only certain categories of weapons.

Now we are hoping to go forward with the second round of negotiations. That second round will begin, we trust, in October. That means that we can begin in October, provided action is taken on the treaty and on the offensive agreement that we have before you at this time, sometime in the summer months; we would trust before the 1st of September. I don't mean that it should take that long, but I would hope you can finish by the 1st of September so we can go forward with the negotiation in October.

The other point that should be made with regard to the follow-on agreements is not related to your approval of these agreements. It is related to the actions of the Con-

gress on defense. I know there is disagreement among various Members of the Congress with regard to what our defense levels ought to be. I think, however, I owe it to you and to the Nation to say that Mr. Brezhnev and his colleagues made it absolutely clear that they are going forward with defense programs in the offensive area which are not limited by these agreements.

Under those circumstances, since they will be going forward with their programs, for the United States not to go forward with its programs—and I am not suggesting which ones at this point; you can go into that later—but for the United States not to go forward with its offensive programs, or worse, for the United States unilaterally to reduce its offensive programs would mean that any incentive that the Soviets had to negotiate the follow-on agreement would be removed.

It is for that reason, without getting into the specifics as to what the level of defense spending should be, as to what the offensive programs should be, I am simply saying that if we want a follow-on agreement, we have to have two steps: We need first, of course, to approve these

agreements. No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/29 : LOC-HAK-225-2-2-7 asked me to present to you the White House perspective on these agreements, and the general background, with the technical information and some more of the details to be supplied by the formal witnesses before your various committees.

These are just some random thoughts that I had on this matter. I will simply close by saying that as one stands in this room and in this house, one always has a tendency to think of some of the tragedies of history of the past. As many of you know, I have always been, and am, a great admirer of Woodrow Wilson. As all of you know, the great tragedy of his life was that after he came back with the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, due to ineffective consultation, the Senate rejected the treaty and rejected the League.

We, of course, do not want that to happen. We do not think that it will happen, because we have appreciated the consultation we have had up to this point, and we are now going forward with this meeting at this time.

I will only say that in looking at what Wilson said during that debate, when he was traveling the country, he made a very, it seemed to me, moving and eloquent statement. He said: "My clients are the children. My clients are the future generation."

This is an election year, and I realize that in an election year it is difficult to move as objectively as we ordinarily would move on any issue, but I would respectfully request the Members of the House and Senate, Republican and Democratic to approach this in the spirit that Wilson explained in that period when they were de-

bating whether they should go forward with the League of Nations, remembering that our clients are the next generation, that approval of these agreements, the treaty limiting defensive weapons, the agreement limiting offensive weapons in certain categories, and also the continuation of a credible defense posture, will mean that we will have done our duty by our clients, which are the next generation.

Thank you.

NOTE: The President spoke at 9:18 a.m. in the State Dining Room at the White House. Invited to the briefing were 122 members of the five Congressional committees having jurisdiction over the details of the agreements: the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Senate Armed Services Committee, and House Armed Services Committee.

For Dr. Kissinger's remarks at the briefing, see the following item.

Remarks of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
June 15, 1972

No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/29 : LOC-HAK-225-2-2-7 asked me to present to you the White House perspective on these agreements, and the general background, with the technical information and some more of the details to be supplied by the formal witnesses before your various committees.

I will read a statement to you which we will distribute. It is still in the process of being typed.

In considering the two agreements before the Congress, the treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems and the interim agreement on the limitation of offensive arms, the overriding questions are these: Do these agreements permit the United States to maintain a defense posture that guarantees our security and protects our vital interests? Second, will they lead to a more enduring structure of peace?

In the course of the formal hearings over the coming days and weeks, the Administration will demonstrate conclusively that they serve both of these ends. I will begin that process this morning by offering some general remarks on the agreement, after which I will be happy to take your questions.

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE 1970's

The first part of my remarks will deal with U.S.-Soviet relations as they affect these agreements. The agreement which was signed 46 minutes before midnight in Moscow on the evening of May 26 by President Nixon and

General Secretary Brezhnev is without precedent in the nuclear age; indeed, in all relevant modern history.

Never before have the world's two most powerful nations, divided by ideology, history, and conflicting interests, placed their central armaments under formally agreed limitation and restraint. It is fair to ask: What new conditions now prevail to have made this step commend itself to the calculated self-interests of both of the so-called superpowers, as it so clearly must have done for both willingly to undertake it?

Let me start, therefore, with a sketch of the broad design of what the President has been trying to achieve in this country's relations with the Soviet Union, since at each important turning point in the SALT negotiations we were guided not so much by the tactical solution that seemed most equitable or prudent, important as it was, but by an underlying philosophy and a specific perception of international reality.

The international situation has been undergoing a profound structural change since at least the mid-1960's. The post-WoNo Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/29 : LOC-HAK-225-2-2-7 powers had been altered to the point that when this Administration took office, a major reassessment was clearly in order.

The nations that had been prostrate in 1945 had regained their economic strength and their political vitality. The Communist bloc was divided into contending factions, and nationalistic forces and social and economic pressures were reasserting themselves within the individual Communist states.

Perhaps most important for the United States, our undisputed strategic predominance was declining just at a time when there was rising domestic resistance to military programs, and impatience for redistribution of resources from national defense to social demands.

Amidst all of this profound change, however, there was one important constant—the continuing dependence of most of the world's hopes for stability and peace upon the ability to reduce the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The factors which perpetuated that rivalry remain real and deep.

—We are ideological adversaries, and we will in all likelihood remain so for the foreseeable future.

—We are political and military competitors, and neither can be indifferent to advances by the other in either of these fields.

—We each have allies whose association we value and whose interests and activities of each impinge on those of the other at numerous points.

—We each possess an awesome nuclear force created and designed to meet the threat implicit in the other's strength and aims.

Each of us has thus come into possession of power singlehandedly capable of exterminating the human race. Paradoxically, this very fact, and the global interests of both sides, create a certain commonality of outlook, a sort of interdependence for survival between the two of us.

Although we compete, the conflict will not admit of resolution by victory in the classical sense. We are compelled to coexist. We have an inescapable obligation to build jointly a structure for peace. Recognition of this reality is the beginning of wisdom for a sane and effective foreign policy today.

President Nixon has made it the starting point of the United States policy since 1969. This Administration's being based on the principles of the classical balance of power. To the extent that that term implies a belief that security requires a measure of equilibrium, it has a certain validity. No national leader has the right to mortgage the survival of his people to the good will of another state. We must seek firmer restraints on the actions of potentially hostile states than a sanguine appeal to their good nature.

But to the extent that balance of power means constant jockeying for marginal advantages over an opponent, it no longer applies. The reason is that the determination of national power has changed fundamentally in the nuclear age. Throughout history, the primary concern of most national leaders has been to accumulate geopolitical and military power. It would have seemed inconceivable even a generation ago that such power once gained could not be translated directly into advantage over one's opponent. But now both we and the Soviet Union have begun to find that each increment of power does not necessarily represent an increment of usable political strength.

With modern weapons, a potentially decisive advantage requires a change of such magnitude that the mere effort to obtain it can produce disaster. The simple tit-for-tat reaction to each other's programs of a decade ago is in danger of being overtaken by a more or less simultaneous and continuous process of technological advance, which opens more and more temptations for seeking decisive advantage.

A premium is put on striking first and on creating a defense to blunt the other side's retaliatory capability. In other words, marginal additions of power cannot be decisive. Potentially decisive additions are extremely dangerous, and the quest for them very destabilizing. The argument that arms races produce war has often been exaggerated. The nuclear age is overshadowed by its peril.

All of this was in the President's mind as he mapped the new directions of American policy at the outset of this Administration. There was reason to believe that the Soviet leadership might also be thinking along similar lines as the repeated failure of their attempts to gain marginal advantage in local crises or in military competition underlined the limitation of old policy approaches.

The President, therefore, decided that the United States should work to create a set of circumstances which would offer the Soviet leaders an opportunity to move away from confrontation through carefully prepared negotiations. From the first, we rejected the notion that what was lacking was a cordial climate for conducting

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 changes in atmospherics, but not buttressed by concrete progress, will revert to previous patterns at the first subsequent clash of interests.

We have, instead, sought to move forward across a broad range of issues so that progress in one area would add momentum to the progress of other areas.

We hoped that the Soviet Union would acquire a stake in a wide spectrum of negotiations and that it would become convinced that its interests would be best served if the entire process unfolded. We have sought, in short, to create a vested interest in mutual restraint.

At the same time, we were acutely conscious of the contradictory tendencies at work in Soviet policy. Some factors—such as the fear of nuclear war, the emerging consumer economy, and the increased pressures of a technological, administrative society—have encouraged the Soviet leaders to seek a more stable relationship with the United States. Other factors—such as ideology, bureaucratic inertia, and the catalytic effect of turmoil in peripheral areas—have prompted pressures for tactical gains.

The President has met each of these manifestations on its own terms, demonstrating receptivity to constructive Soviet initiatives and firmness in the face of provocations or adventurism. He has kept open a private channel through which the two sides could communicate candidly and settle matters rapidly. The President was convinced

that agreements dealing with questions of armaments in isolation do not, in fact, produce lasting inhibitions on military competition because they contribute little to the kind of stability that makes crises less likely. In recent months, major progress was achieved in moving toward a broadly-based accommodation of interests with the U.S.S.R., in which an arms limitation agreement could be a central element.

This approach was called linkage, not by the Administration, and became the object of considerable debate in 1969. Now, 3 years later, the SALT agreement does not stand alone, isolated and incongruous in the relationship of hostility, vulnerable at any moment to the shock of some sudden crisis. It stands, rather, linked organically, to a chain of agreements and to a broad understanding about international conduct appropriate to the dangers of the nuclear age.

The agreements on the limitation of strategic arms is, thus, not merely a technical accomplishment, although it is that in part, but it must be seen as a political event of some magnitude. This is relevant to the question of easily breached or circumvented. Given the past, no one can answer that question with certainty, but it can be said with some assurance that any country which contemplates a rupture of the agreement or a circumvention of its letter and spirit must now face the fact that it will be placing in jeopardy not only a limited arms control agreement, but a broad political relationship.

PREPARATIONS FOR THE ARMS TALKS

Let me turn now to the more specific decisions we had to make about what the agreement should do and how it could be achieved.

We knew that any negotiations on arms control, especially ones involving those central weapons systems which guarantee each side's security, were found to be sensitive and complicated, requiring frequent high-level decisions.

The possibility of a deadlock would be ever present, and the repercussions of a deadlock could not help but affect U.S.-Soviet relations across the board. We had to begin, therefore, by assessing what the situation was in terms of armaments in place and under construction; what realistic alternatives we had at the negotiating table; and how a tentative or partial agreement would compare with no agreement at all.

For various reasons during the 1960's, the United States had, as you know, made the strategic decision to terminate its building programs in major offensive systems

and to rely instead on qualitative improvements. By 1969, therefore, we had no active or planned programs for deploying additional ICBM's, submarine-launched ballistic missiles or bombers. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had dynamic and accelerated deployment programs in both land-based and sea-based missiles. You know, too, that the interval between conception and deployment of strategic weapons systems is generally 5 to 10 years.

At the same time, both sides were in the initial stage of strategic defense programs, each approaching the anti-missile problem from a different standpoint. The Soviets wanted to protect their capital. The United States program concentrated on protecting our retaliatory forces. Both sides also possessed weapons which, although not central to the strategic balance, were nevertheless relevant to it. We have aircraft deployed at forward bases and on carriers. The Soviet Union has a sizable arsenal of intermediate-range missiles able to attack our forward bases and devastate the territory of our allies.

A further complication was that the composition of forces on the two sides was not symmetrical. The Soviet Union had no Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/29 : LOC-HAK-225-2-2-7 own territory while the United States had turned increasingly to sea-based systems.

The result was that they had a panoply of different ICBM's while we essentially had one general class of ICBM's, the Minuteman, together with a more effective and modern submarine force operating from bases overseas and equipped with longer-range missiles.

All of this meant that even arriving at a basic definition of strategic equivalency would be technically demanding and politically intricate.

Looking beyond to the desired limitations, it appeared that neither side was going to make major unilateral concessions. When the national survival is at stake, such a step could not contribute to stability. The final outcome would have to be equitable and to offer a more reliable prospect for maintaining security than could be achieved without the agreements.

With these facts in view, the President, in the spring of 1969, established a group of senior officials responsible for preparing and conducting the SALT negotiations.

I acted as Chairman, and the other members included the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

This group, called the Verification Panel, has had the task of analyzing the issues and factors and submitting for

the President's decisions those options which commanded support in the various departments and agencies.

The Verification Panel analyzed each of the weapons systems which could conceivably be involved in an agreement. It compared the effect of different limitations on our program and on the Soviet programs, and weighed the resulting balance. It analyzed the possibilities of verification, and the precise risk of evasion, seeking to determine at what point evasion could be detected and what measures would be available for a response. This was done in various combinations so that if one piece of the equation changed, say the ABM level, the Government would be able to determine the effect of that change upon the other components of a particular negotiating package.

Our aim was to be in a position to give the negotiations a momentum. We wanted to be sure that when stalemates developed, the point at issue would not be largely tactical, and that the alternative solutions would be analyzed ahead of time and ready for immediate decision by the

SUMMARY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

In the first round of the talks, which began in November of 1969, the two sides established a work program and reached some tentative understanding of strategic principles.

For example, both sides more or less agreed at the outset that a very heavy ABM system could be a destabilizing factor, but that the precise level of ABM limitations would have to be set according to our success in agreeing on offensive limitations.

In the spring and summer of 1970, each country put forward more concrete proposals, translating some of the agreed principles into negotiating packages. During this period, we, on the American side, had hopes of reaching a comprehensive limitation. However, the initial search for a comprehensive solution gradually broke down over the question of defining the scope of the forces to be included.

The Soviets believed that strategic meant any weapons system capable of reaching the Soviet Union or the United States. This would have included our forward-based aircraft and carrier forces, but excluded Soviet intermediate range rockets aimed at Europe and other areas.

We opposed this approach, since it would have prejudiced our alliance commitments and raised a distinction between our own security and that of our European allies.

We offered a verifiable ban on the deployment and testing of Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles. The Soviets countered by offering a totally unverifiable production ban, while insisting on the freedom to test, thus placing the control of MIRV's effectively out of reach.

At this juncture, early in 1971, with the stalemate threatening, the President took a major new initiative by opening direct contact with the Soviet leaders to stimulate the SALT discussions and for that matter, the Berlin negotiations, and providing progress could be achieved on these two issues, to explore the feasibility of a summit meeting.

The Soviet leaders' first response was to insist that only the ABM's should be limited, and that offensive systems should be left aside. But as far as we were concerned, the still incipient ABM systems on both sides were far from the most dynamic or dangerous factors in the strategic equation. It was the Soviet offensive programs, moving ahead at the average rate of over 200 land-based and 100 sea-based missiles a year, which we felt constituted the most urgent issue. To limit our option of developing the ABM system without at the same time checking the growth of offensive systems was not an option.

Exchanges between the President and the Soviet leaders embodying these views produced the understanding of May 20, 1971. As any workable compromise in the field must do, that understanding met each side's essential concerns. Since the offensive systems were complex and since agreement with respect to all of them had proved impossible, it was agreed that the initial offensive settlement would be an interim agreement and not a permanent treaty, and that it would freeze only selected categories at agreed levels.

On the defensive side, the understanding called for negotiations towards a permanent ABM solution with talks on both issues to proceed simultaneously to a common conclusion.

This left two major issues for the negotiators, the precise level of the allowed ABM's, and the scope of the interim agreement, specifically what weapons would be included in the freeze.

Devising an equitable agreement on ABM's proved extremely difficult. The United States had virtually completed its ABM site at Grand Forks, and we were working on the second site at Malmstrom. Hence, we proposed freezing deployments at levels operational or under construction, that is to say, two ICBM sites on our side, and the Moscow defense on the other.

The Soviets objected this would deny them the right to have any protection for their ICBM's, a new formula

was then devised allowing each side to choose two sites, one each for national capital and ICBM defense or both for ICBM defense. The resolution of the ABM issue was completed after our Chiefs of Staff, supported by the Secretary of Defense, decided that a site in Washington to defend the National Command Authority was to be preferred over the second ICBM-protective site at Malmstrom. They reasoned that while a limited defense would not assure the ultimate survival of the National Command Authority, it would buy time against a major attack while the radars in both the NCA defense and the defense of ICBM's would provide valuable warning. Moreover, an NCA defense would protect the National Command Authority in the event of a small attack by some third country or even an accidental or unauthorized launch of a weapon toward the United States.

The President accepted their recommendation.

What about the offensive weapons freeze? Early in the discussions about the implementation of this portion of the May 20 understanding between the President and the Soviet leaders, it was decided to exclude from the freeze bombers and so-called forward-based systems. To exclude, in this country holds an advantage.

We urge the Congress to keep this fact in mind, when assessing the numerical ratios of weapons which are subject to the offensive freeze.

There was also relatively rapid agreement following the May 20 breakthrough that intercontinental ballistic missiles would be covered. This left the issue of the inclusion of submarines.

With respect to ICBM's and submarines, the situation was as follows: The Soviet Union had been deploying at the average annual rate of 200 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 100 sea-based ballistic missiles a year. The U.S. had completed deployments of Minuteman and the 41 Polaris submarines in 1967. Of course, as you know, we are engaged in increasing the number of warheads on both our ICBM's and submarine-launched missiles. We were, and are, developing a new submarine system, although it cannot be deployed until 1978 or until after the end of the freeze. In other words, as a result of decisions made in the 1960's, and not reversible within the timeframe of the projected agreement, there would be a numerical gap against us in the two categories of land- and sea-based missile systems whether or not there was an agreement. Without an agreement, the gap would steadily widen.

The agreement would not create the gap. It would prevent its enlargement to our disadvantage. In short, a

freeze of ICBM's and sea-based systems would be overwhelmingly in the United States' interest.

These basic considerations undoubtedly impelled the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that any freeze which was to command their support must include the submarine-based system. The only possible alternative was a crash program for building additional missile-launching submarines. The President explored this idea with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations. Their firm judgment was that such a program was undesirable. It could not produce results before 1976—that is, toward the very end of a projected freeze—and only by building a type of submarine similar to our current fleet, and without many of the features most needed for the 1980's and beyond.

The President once again used his direct channel to the Soviet leaders, this time to urge the inclusion of missile-launching submarines in the offensive agreement.

After a long period of hesitation, the Soviet leaders agreed in principle at the end of April. Final details were worked out in Moscow between the President and the Soviet

My purpose in dwelling at such length upon the details of our internal deliberations and negotiations has been to make one crucial point: Neither the freeze of ICBM's nor the freeze of submarine-launched missiles was a Soviet idea, and hence, it is not an American concession. On the contrary, in both cases it was the Soviet Union which reluctantly acceded to American proposals after long and painful deliberation.

PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT

I will not spend this group's time in further review of the frequently arduous negotiations in Vienna, Helsinki, and during the summit in Moscow leading to the final agreement. I do want to pay tribute on behalf of the President to Ambassador Smith and his delegation, whose dedication, negotiating skill, and patience contributed decisively to the outcome.

Let me summarize the principal provisions of the documents as signed. The ABM treaty allows each side to have one ABM site for the defense of its national command authority and another site for defense of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The two must be at least 1,300 kilometers, or 800 miles, apart in order to prevent the development of a territorial defense. Each ABM site can have 100 ABM interceptors.

The treaty contains additional provisions which effectively prohibit either the establishment of a radar base

for the defense of populated areas or the attainment of capabilities to intercept ballistic missiles by conversion of air defense missiles to anti-ballistic missiles.

It provides for withdrawal by either party on 6 months' notice, if supreme national interests are judged to have been jeopardized by extraordinary events. By setting a limit to ABM defenses the treaty not only eliminates one area of potentially dangerous defensive competition, but it reduces the incentive for continuing deployment of offensive systems.

As long as it lasts, offensive missile forces have, in effect, a free ride to their targets. Beyond a certain level of sufficiency, differences in numbers are therefore not conclusive.

The interim agreement on offensive arms is to run for 5 years, unless replaced by a more comprehensive permanent agreement which will be the subject of further negotiations, or unless terminated by notification similar to that for the treaty.

In essence this agreement will freeze the numbers of strategic offensive missiles on both sides at approximately the levels currently operational and under construction. The United States and 1,618 for the Soviet Union. Within this overall limitation, the Soviet Union has accepted a freeze of its heavy ICBM launchers, the weapons most threatening to our strategic forces.

There is also a prohibition on conversion of light ICBM's into heavy missiles. These provisions are buttressed by verifiable provisions and criteria, specifically the prohibition against any significant enlargement of missile silos.

The submarine limitations are more complicated. In brief, the Soviets are frozen to their claimed current level, operational and under construction, of about 740 missiles, some of them on an older type nuclear submarine. They are permitted to build to a ceiling of 62 boats and 950 missiles, but only if they dismantle older ICBM's or submarine-based missiles to offset the new construction.

This would mean dismantling 210 ICBM's and some 30 missiles on some nine older nuclear submarines. Bombers and other aircraft are not included in this agreement.

In sum, the interim offensive agreement will keep the overall number of strategic ballistic missile launchers both on land and at sea within an agreed ceiling which is essentially the current level, operational or under construction. It will not prohibit the United States from continuing current and planned strategic offensive programs, since neither the multiple-warhead conversion, nor the B-1 is within the purview of the freeze and since the ULM's

submarine system is not, or never was planned for deployment until after 1977. The agreement will stop the Soviet Union from increasing the existing numerical gap in missile launchers.

Finally, there are a number of interpretative statements which were provided to the Congress along with the agreements. These interpretations are in several forms: Agreed statements initialed by the delegations, agreed interpretations or common understandings which were not set down formally and initialed, unilateral interpretations to make our position clear in instances where we could not get total agreement.

In any negotiation of this complexity, there will inevitably be details upon which the parties cannot agree. We made certain unilateral statements in order to insure that our positions on these details was included in the negotiating record and understood by the other side.

The agreed interpretations and common understandings for the most part deal with detailed technical aspects of limitations on ABM systems and offensive weapons. For example, it was agreed that the size of missile silos could not be significantly increased and that "significantly"

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been part of a larger decision to place relations on a new foundation of restraint, cooperation, and steadily evolving confidence. A spectrum of agreements on joint efforts with regard to the environment, space, health, and promising negotiations on economic relations provides a prospect for avoiding the failure of the Washington Naval Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand pact outlawing war which collapsed in part for lack of an adequate political foundation.

In the more important unilateral declarations we made clear to the Soviets that the introduction of land mobile ICBM's would be inconsistent with the agreement. Since the publication of the various unilateral interpretative statements, suggestions have been heard that the language of the treaty and agreement in fact hide deep-seated disagreements. But it must be recognized that in any limited agreements, which are between old-time adversaries, there are bound to be certain gaps.

In this case the gaps relate not so much to the terms themselves, but rather to what it was impossible to include. The interpretations do not vitiate these agreements, but they expand and add to the agreements.

WHAT DO THE AGREEMENTS MEAN?

Taking the longer perspective, what can we say has been accomplished?

First, it is clear that the agreement will enhance the security of both sides. No agreement which fails to do so could have been signed in the first place or stood any chance of lasting after it was signed. An attempt to gain a unilateral advantage in the strategic field must be self-defeating.

The President has given the most careful consideration to the final terms. He has asked me to reiterate most emphatically this morning his conviction that the agreements fully protect our national security and our vital interests.

Secondly, the President is determined that our security and vital interests shall remain fully protected. If the Senate consents to ratification of the treaty and if the Congress approves the interim agreement, the Administration will, therefore, pursue two parallel courses.

On the one hand, we shall push the next phase of the strategic arms limitation talks with the same energy and conviction that have produced these initial agreements.

On the other hand, until further arms limits are negotiated, we shall push research and development and the production capacity to remain in a fully protected strategic posture should follow-on agreements prove unattainable and so as to avoid giving the other side a temptation to break out of the agreement.

Third, the President believes that these agreements, embedded as they are in the fabric of an emerging new relationship, can hold tremendous political and historical significance in the coming decades. For the first time, two great powers, deeply divided by their divergent values, philosophies, and social systems, have agreed to restrain the very armaments on which their national survival depends. No decision of this magnitude could have been

The final verdict must wait on events, but there is at least reason to hope that these accords represent a major break in the pattern of suspicion, hostility, and confrontation which has dominated U.S.-Soviet relations for a generation. The two great nuclear powers must not let this opportunity slip away by jockeying for marginal advantages.

Inevitably an agreement of such consequence raises serious questions on the part of concerned individuals of quite different persuasions. I cannot do justice to all of them here. Let me deal with some of the most frequently asked since the agreements were signed 3 weeks ago.

Who won?

The President has already answered this question. He has stressed that it is inappropriate to pose the question in terms of victory or defeat. In an agreement of this kind, either both sides win or both sides lose. This will either be a serious attempt to turn the world away from time-worn practices of jockeying for power, or there will be

endless, wasteful, and purposeless competition in the acquisition of armaments.

Does the agreement perpetuate a U.S. strategic disadvantage?

We reject the premise of that question on two grounds. First, the present situation is on balance advantageous to the United States. Second, the Interim Agreement perpetuates nothing which did not already exist in fact and which could only have gotten worse without an agreement.

Our present strategic military situation is sound. Much of the criticism has focused on the imbalance in number of missiles between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. But, this only examines one aspect of the problem. To assess the overall balance it is necessary to consider those forces not in the agreement; our bomber force which is substantially larger and more effective than the Soviet bomber force, and our forward base systems.

The quality of the weapons must also be weighed. We are confident we have a major advantage in nuclear weapons. No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/29 : LOC-HAK-225-2-2-7 on the basis of the MIRV's we have a two-to-one lead today in numbers of warheads and this lead will be maintained during the period of the agreement, even if the Soviets develop and deploy MIRV's of their own.

Then there are such factors as deployment characteristics. For example, because of the difference in geography and basing, it has been estimated that the Soviet Union requires three submarines for two of ours to be able to keep an equal number on station.

When the total picture is viewed, our strategic forces are seen to be completely sufficient.

The Soviets have more missile launchers, but when other relevant systems such as bombers are counted there are roughly the same number of launchers on each side. We have a big advantage on warheads. The Soviets have an advantage on megatonnage.

What is disadvantageous to us, though, is the trend of new weapons deployment by the Soviet Union and the projected imbalance 5 years hence based on that trend. The relevant question to ask, therefore, is what the freeze prevents; where would we be by 1977 without a freeze? Considering the current momentum by the Soviet Union, in both ICBM's and submarine launched ballistic missiles, the ceiling set in the Interim Agreement can only be interpreted as a sound arrangement that makes a major contribution to our national security.

Does the agreement jeopardize our security in the future?

The current arms race compounds numbers by technology. The Soviet Union has proved that it can best compete in sheer numbers. This is the area which is limited by the agreement.

Thus the agreement confines the competition with the Soviets to the area of technology. And, heretofore, we have had a significant advantage.

The follow-on negotiations will attempt to bring the technological race under control. Until these negotiations succeed, we must take care not to anticipate their outcome by unilateral decisions.

Can we trust the Soviets?

The possibility always exists that the Soviets will treat the Moscow agreements as they have sometimes treated earlier ones, as just another tactical opportunity in the protracted conflict. If this happens, the United States will have to respond. This we shall plan to prepare to do psychologically and strategically and provided the Congress accepts the strategic programs on which the acceptance of the agreements was predicated.

I have said enough to indicate we advocate these agreements on the basis of the enlightened self-interests of both sides. This self-interest is reinforced by the carefully drafted verification provisions in the agreement. Beyond the legal obligations, both sides have a stake in all of the agreements that have been signed, and a large stake in the broad process of improvement in relations that has begun. The Soviet leaders are serious men, and we are confident that they will not lightly abandon the course that has led to the summit meeting and to these initial agreements. For our own part, we will not abandon this course without major provocation, because it is in the interest of this country and in the interest of mankind to pursue it.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

At the conclusion of the Moscow summit, the President and General Secretary Brezhnev signed a Declaration of Principles to govern the future relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. These principles state that there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence in the nuclear age. They commit both sides to avoid direct armed confrontation, to use restraint in local conflicts, to assert no special claims in derogation of the sovereign equality of all nations, to stress cooperation and negotiation at all points of our relationship.

At this point, these principles reflect an aspiration and an attitude. This Administration will spare no effort to translate the aspiration into reality. We shall strive with

determination to overcome further the miasma of suspicion and self-confirming preemptive actions which have characterized the Cold War.

Of course the temptation is to continue along well worn paths. The status quo has the advantage of reality, but history is strewn with the wreckage of nations which sought their future in their past. Catastrophe has resulted far less often from conscious decisions than from the fear of breaking loose from established patterns through the inexorable march towards cataclysm because nobody knew what else to do. The paralysis of policy which destroyed Europe in 1914 would surely destroy the world if we let it happen again in the nuclear age.

Thus the deepest question we ask is not whether we can trust the Soviets, but whether we can trust ourselves. Some have expressed concern about the agreements not because they object to their terms, but because they are afraid of the euphoria that these agreements might produce.

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tension just to carry out programs which our national sur-

vival should dictate in any event. We must not develop a national psychology by which we can act only on the basis of what we are against and not on what we are for.

Our challenges then are: Can we chart a new course with hope but without illusion, with large purposes but without sentimentality? Can we be both generous and strong? It is not often that a country has the opportunity to answer such questions meaningfully. We are now at such a juncture where peace and progress depend on our faith and our fortitude.

It is in this spirit that the President has negotiated the agreements. It is in this spirit that he asks the approval of the treaty and the Interim Agreement and that I now stand ready to answer your questions.

NOTE: Dr. Kissinger spoke at 9:30 a.m. in the State Dining Room at the White House. The White House also released the transcript of

FOR THE PRESIDENT'S REMARKS AT THE DINING see the preceding item.